Jammu Kashmir High Court Upholds PSA Detention of Baramulla Man Accused of LeT Links | Kashmir Life

SRINAGAR: The High Court of Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh has upheld the preventive detention of a Baramulla resident accused of acting as an Over Ground Worker for the banned militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, ruling that the detention order was backed by “relevant and tangible material” and did not suffer from any constitutional or procedural infirmity.

Dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed through the detainee’s wife, Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal held that the constitutional safeguards available under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act had been duly complied with and that the Court could not sit in appeal over the “subjective satisfaction” recorded by the detaining authority.

The petition challenged detention order No. 09/DMB/PSA/2025 dated April 29, 2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Baramulla under Section 8(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 against Tanveer Ahmad Mir, a resident of Brath Kalan in Bomai area of Baramulla district.

The petitioner was represented by senior advocate ST Hussain along with advocate Nida Nazir, while the Union Territory was represented by Deputy Advocate General Hakim Aman Ali.

According to the detention record placed before the Court, the detenue was alleged to be an active Over Ground Worker affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba who had provided shelter, transportation and logistical support to militants operating in Sopore and adjoining areas. The authorities also alleged that he maintained contact with militants and handlers based in Pakistan through encrypted communication applications and proxy networks.

Challenging the detention, the petitioner argued that the order had been passed mechanically without independent application of mind and that the grounds of detention were merely a reproduction of the police dossier. It was also contended that the detenue had not been supplied all material relied upon by the authorities, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to make an effective representation against the detention.

The petitioner further argued that the allegations were vague and unsupported by particulars and that ordinary criminal law was sufficient because the detenue was already facing prosecution in FIR No. 203/2018. The petition also raised a constitutional challenge to the adaptation of the Public Safety Act after the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, contending that the expression “security of the State” could not legally be substituted with “security of the Union Territory” through executive action.

The government opposed the plea, asserting that the detention had been ordered strictly in accordance with law after careful examination of intelligence inputs, criminal antecedents and the prevailing security situation in the Valley. The respondents maintained that the detenue continued to remain involved in activities prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory despite earlier criminal proceedings and preventive measures.

In a detailed judgment running across multiple constitutional and procedural issues, the High Court rejected the challenge to the validity of the adapted provisions of the PSA and held that Parliament itself had empowered the Central Government under Sections 95 and 96 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act to make adaptations and modifications necessary for applying existing laws to the successor Union Territories.

Justice Nargal observed that the substitution of the word “State” with “Union Territory” through SO. 1229(E) dated March 31, 2020 did not alter the basic character of the Public Safety Act and was a “consequential change” flowing from the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir.

“The continuance of the Jammu Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 after reorganisation is not the result of any executive exercise of power, but the Parliament itself, through the Reorganisation Act, allowed it to remain in force,” the Court said while rejecting the constitutional challenge.

The Court also dismissed the contention that the approval granted to the detention order was invalid for not being issued in the name of the President or in alleged violation of the Transaction of Government Business Rules.

The judgment noted that the detention order had been approved by the Government within the statutory period and that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the alleged procedural defects.

Rejecting the argument that the detention order was merely a copy of the police dossier, the Court held that similarity in language between the dossier and grounds of detention could not automatically establish non-application of mind.

“What the Court is required to examine is whether the detaining authority merely acted as a conduit of the police or whether it independently evaluated the material before arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction,” the Court observed.

After examining the detention record, the Court concluded that the detaining authority had considered not only FIR No. 203/2018 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act but also preventive proceedings, intelligence inputs, alleged use of encrypted applications and continuing association with Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives and Pakistan-based handlers.

The Court further referred to the prevailing security situation in Kashmir, particularly after the Pahalgam attack involving killing of tourists, while noting that the authorities apprehended that the detenue could be “reactivated for furthering terrorist objectives.”

On the issue of supply of material, the Court recorded that the detenue had been furnished copies of the detention order, grounds of detention, dossier, FIR and other connected material comprising twenty-five leaves. The contents were also read over and explained to him in Urdu and Kashmiri, the Court noted.

The judgment further recorded that the detenue had been informed about his right to make a representation and had in fact exercised that right, which was subsequently rejected by the competent authority.

Emphasising the distinction between preventive detention and punitive detention, the Court relied upon Supreme Court rulings including Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal and Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India, to hold that pendency of criminal proceedings or grant of bail does not bar authorities from invoking preventive detention laws where future security threats are apprehended.

“The object of preventive detention is not to punish an individual for a past offence but to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to public order or security in future,” the Court observed.

Justice Nargal underscored that courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot reassess the adequacy of material or substitute their own opinion merely because another view is possible.

“This Court is conscious of the fact that matters concerning national security, terrorism and activities prejudicial to the security of the Union Territory stand on a distinct footing,” the judgment said, adding that while personal liberty is of “paramount constitutional importance,” it may “at times yield to larger considerations of security and public safety.”

Concluding that the detention order did not suffer from “constitutional infirmity, procedural illegality, mala fide, perversity or jurisdictional error,” the Court dismissed the petition and upheld the preventive detention.